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THE APPLICATION OF THE SUBSTITUTION OF JUDGMENT
DOCTRINE IN PLANNING AN INCOMPETENT'S ESTATE
I.

INTRODUCTION

Recent advances in psychiatric diagnosis have resulted in an increase
in both the number of persons who are declared incompetent before death
and the duration of their incompetency. Unfortunately, this development
has created problems since few people provide for the possibility that they
may become incompetent in their old age.' Estate planners are faced with
the challenge of providing for the incompetent's needs and conserving his
estate in a manner which is responsive to both the present interests of the
incompetent and the longer range requirements of his estate plan. This
area of estate planning necessarily involves the personal interests of both
the incompetent and his heirs.
It is the purpose of this Comment to examine the powers of guardians
and the courts under the doctrine of substitution of judgment to administer
the estates of incompetents. This doctrine has traditionally permitted courts
to award payments 2 from the estate of an incompetent to persons the incompetent was under no legal duty to provide for. In theory, the court
stands in the shoes of the incompetent and inquires whether it would have
given assistance under the circumstances. This doctrine does not apply,
however, to those cases most frequently before the courts - applications
3
by persons to whom the incompetent owes a legal duty of support.4
Consequently, courts have permitted an allowance to be made to a spouse
1. For a general discussion of the practical and academic problems arising from
a failure to provide for incompetency, see Zillgitt, Planning for Incompetency and
Possibilities and Practices Under the Conservatorship Law, 37 S. CAL. L. REv. 181
(1964) ; Note, Guardianship in the Planned Estate, 45 IowA L. REv. 360 (1960).
2. Most of the payments under the substitution of judgment doctrine have come
from the income of the incompetent's assets rather than from the principal. The
courts are reluctant to disburse corpus, undoubtedly because any such disposition seems
a more permanent reduction of his property. See In re Bond, 198 Misc. 256, 98
N.Y.S.2d 81 (Sup. Ct. 1950) ; In re Fleming, 173 Misc. 851, 19 N.Y.S.2d 234 (Sup.
Ct. 1940). But see In re du Pont, 41 Del. Ch. 300, 194 A.2d 309 (1963), where the
court in discussing this problem stated:
If the quoted language was intended to suggest that the principle of substitution of judgment . . . can have no application to a disbursement from principal,
it is not an acceptable statement of the Delaware law. I conclude that the substitution of judgment doctrine is not so restricted. Rather, the fact that a disbursement of principal is involved in the request only requires the court to move
with greater caution in exercising its discretion.
Id. at 314, 194 A.2d at 317.
3. In In re Berllstein, 145 Ohio St. 397, 62 N.E.2d 205 (1945), the concurring
judge succinctly stated:
The allowance to provide support for dependents of the incompetent person
does not involve the so-called doctrine of substitution of judgment. That doctrine
is called into being, in those jurisdictions wherein it is recognized, when the court
is asked to make an allowance out of the incompetent's estate to persons for whom
he is not bound to provide.
Id. at 404, 62 N.E.2d at 208.
4. See, e.g., In re Griffith, 33 Del. Ch. 387, 93 A.2d 920 (1953); Stoltze v.
Stoltze, 393 Ill. 433, 66 N.E.2d 424 (1946) ; In re de Nisson, 197 Wash. 265, 84 P.2d
1024 (1938).
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or a minor child5 of an incompetent, not on the theory that this incompetent would have provided for them if he were sane, but because the
incompetent's disability does not alter his legal duty to support his family."
After discussing the scope of the substitution of judgment doctrine, particular emphasis will be placed on the application of this doctrine in Penn7
sylvania. Finally, Article V of the Proposed Uniform Probate Code,
entitled Protection of Persons Under Disability and Their Property, will be
examined in order to ascertain its effect upon the substitution of judgment
doctrine, and to determine whether such legislative reform is necessary.
II.

HISTORY OF THE DOCTRINE

As previously mentioned,8 the substitution of judgment doctrine is
grounded on the theory that, an incompetent is a ward of the court and
that the court should exercise its discretion and assert its judgment to
make distributions out of his estate which it has reason to believe the
incompetent himself would make if he had the capacity to act.
A.

Traditional Application

The principle which has become known as the substitution of judgment doctrine was originally announced in the English case of Ex parte
Whitbread.9 In this case a niece of the incompetent petitioned for an
allowance from the surplus income of the incompetent's estate. In authorizing an allowance for needy brothers and sisters and their children, Lord
Eldon stated:
[T]he Court, in making the allowance, has nothing to consider but
the situation of the lunatic himself, always looking to the probability
of his recovery, and never regarding the interest of the next of kin.
With this view only, in cases where the estate is considerable, and the
persons who will probably be entitled to it hereafter are otherwise
unprovided for, the Court, looking at what it is likely the Lunatic
himself would do, if he were in a capacity to act, will make some
provision out of the estate for these persons. 10
5. See, e.g., Harris v. District of Columbia, 357 F.2d 593 (D.C. Cir. 1966)
Gaskins v. Security-First Nat'l Bank, 30 Cal. App. 2d 409, 86 P.2d 681 (1939);
Marsh v. Scott, 2 N.J. Super. 240, 63 A.2d 275 (1949).
6. In In re Henderson, 45 Pa. D. & C. 359 (C.P. Bedford 1942), the incompetent father's entire estate consisted of a railroad relief pension, all of which was
required for the father's needs. The court exercised its discretion to deny an allowance for the support and education of the father's minor child.
7. SECTION OF REAL PROPERTY, PROBATE, AND TRUST LAW & NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, PROPOSED UNIFORM PROBATE
CODE (1969)
[hereinafter cited as PROBATE CODE]. The House of Delegates of the
American Bar Association approved the PROBATE CODE at its annual meeting at Dallas,

Texas, in August, 1969.

8. See p. 132 supra.

9. 35 Eng. Rep. 878 (Mer. 1816).
10. Id. at 879 (emphasis added).
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The basis of this decision, therefore, was not that the brothers and sisters
had any right to an allowance, but that the court was merely authorizing
what the incompetent himself would probably have done."
As enunciated in Whitbread, the substitution of judgment doctrine
permitted payment out of the "surplus"' 12 beyond the incompetent's needs
to "immediate relations"" who are "otherwise unprovided for."' 4 This
principle has been extended by subsequent decisions" to permit distributions out of principal"' and for purposes other than support."

In addi-

tion, while the most frequent beneficiaries continue to be relatives of the
incompetent," payments have been permitted to persons outside the family.
20
19
For example, allowances have been made for friends, a retired servant
2
and for charitable gifts.

1

11. Id. at 879. See p. 135 infra, for an analysis of the factors which the courts
will consider in determining an incompetent's probable course of conduct.
12. 35 Eng. Rep. at 879.
13. 35 Eng. Rep. at 878. It should be noted, however, that the Lord Chancellor
was not convinced that distributions should be restricted to the immediate family.
In regard to this issue he stated:
The difficulty I have had was as to the extent of relationship to which an
allowance ought to be granted. I have found instances in which the Court has,
in its allowances to the relations of the Lunatic, gone to a further distance than
grand-children - to brothers and other collateral kindred; and if we get to the
principle, we find that it is not because the parties are next of kin of the Lunatic,
or, as such, have any right to an allowance, but because the Court will not refuse
to do, for the benefit of the Lunatic, that which it is probable the Lunatic himself
would have done.
Id. at 879.
14. Id. at 879.
15. For an illuminating discussion of the early development of the doctrine, see
Thompson & Hale, The Surplus Income of a Lunatic, 8 HARv. L. REv. 472 (1895).
16. See note 2 supra.
17. Recently, courts have held that need on the part of the recipient is not a
necessary condition and have permitted distributions from incompetents' estates for
the purpose of avoiding estate taxes. See Estate of Christiansen, 248 Cal. App. 2d 398,
56 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1967) ; In re du Pont, 41 Del. Ch. 300, 194 A.2d 309 (1963) ; In re
Myles, 57 Misc. 2d 101, 291 N.Y.S.2d 71 (Sup. Ct. 1968) ; In re Carson, 39 Misc. 2d
544, 241 N.Y.S.2d 288 (Sup. Ct. 1962) ; In re Kenan, 262 N.C. 627, 138 S.E.2d 547
(1964). Generally, the courts have concluded that a reasonable man in planning his
estate would make gifts in order to avoid unnecessary estate or inheritance taxes.
For a detailed discussion on the applicability of the substitution of judgment doctrine
in tax avoidance situations, see pp. 139-41 infra.
18. E.g., In re Jacobson, 56 Cal. App. 2d 255, 132 P.2d 229 (1942) (mother);
In re Brice, 233 Iowa 183, 8 N.W.2d 576 (1943) (nephew) ; In re Buckley, 330 Mich.
102, 47 N.W.2d 33 (1951) (brothers and sisters) ; In re Groebe, 49 N.J. Super. 111,
139 A.2d 317 (1958) (sister) ;In re Fleming, 173 Misc. 851, 19 N.Y.S.2d 234 (Sup.
Ct. 1940) (niece) ; In re Flagler, 130 Misc. 554, 224 N.Y.S. 27 (Sup. Ct. 1926)
(cousin). For an excellent summary of the case law in this area, see Annot., 24
A.L.R.3d 868 (1969).
19. In In re Heeney, 2 Barb. Ch. 326 (N.Y. 1847), the court permitted as a
fixed allowance to three elderly friends of the incompetent "the same allowance which
Mr. Heeney was in the habit of making to them." Id. at 330.
20. In In re Earl of Carysfort, 41 Eng. Rep. 418 (Cr. & Ph. 1840), an annual
allowance was granted out of the income of the incompetent's estate to an old personal servant.
21. See, e.g., Harris v. Harris, 57 Cal. 2d 367, 369 P.2d 481, 19 Cal. Rptr. 793
(1962) (allowances from the surplus income of the estate of incompetent as donations
for charitable and religious purposes were approved) ; In re Brice, 233 Iowa 183,
8 N.W.2d 576 (1943) (allowance granted to a nephew but court recognized its power
to authorize donations for charities) ; Citizens' State Bank v. Shanklin, 174 Mo. App.
639, 161 S.W. 341 (1913) (allowed guardian of incompetent to make contribution
to a church).
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In summary, it may be stated that two conditions must be satisfied
before the courts will authorize an allowance. 22 It must be shown that:
(1) the amount remaining in the incompetent's estate will produce sufficient income to meet his estimated maximum expenses, 23 and (2)

the

incompetent, if he were normal,2 4 would have pursued similar conduct. 25
In determining the incompetent's "probable conduct" the courts, in order
to authorize a distribution, have considered the following factors: (1) the
incurability of his condition;26 (2) his present and future needs;27 (3)
past conduct;28 (4) existing wills or estate plans ;29 (5) his relationship
with the prospective donee;3° and (6)

the needs of the person seeking

the allowance. 31 The purpose of an appraisal of these factual circumstances is to enable the court to act as the incompetent would have, had his
2
capacity to act not been impaired.3
22. For a general discussion of this point, see Comment, Planning Incompetents'
Estates Via Inter-Vivos Distributions, 11 VILL. L. REV. 150, 151 (1965).
23. Estate of Christiansen, 248 Cal. App. 2d 398, 425, 56 Cal. Rptr. 505, 523 (1967).
24. In re du Pont, 41 Del. Ch. 300, 315, 194 A.2d 309, 317 (1963).
25. Comment, supra note 22, at 151.
26. Estate of Christiansen, 248 Cal. App. 2d 398, 56 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1967).
27. In In re du Pont, 41 Del. Ch. 300, 194 A.2d 309 (1963), the court, while
authorizing a distribution from the estate, concluded that:
[T]he property remaining in the guardians' hands after the proposed distribution was shown to be more than sufficient to administer the balance of his estate
and to maintain him in the manner in which he was accustomed to live.
Id. at 315, 194 A.2d at 317.
28. In In re Fleming, 173 Misc. 851, 19 N.Y.S.2d 234 (Sup. Ct. 1940), the court
granted an allowance to a niece of the incompetent on evidence that prior to his
incompetency he had generously contributed to her support.
29. Where there is a will the incompetent has furnished evidence of the objects
of his bounty, and the manner in which he wishes them to share in his estate. In In re
Carson, 39 Misc. 2d 544, 241 N.Y.S.2d 288 (Sup. Ct. 1962), the court set aside the
gift to a daughter because, under the terms of the will, she was not to receive her
share of the incompetent's estate until she attained a certain age.
30. See Estate of Christiansen, 248 Cal. App. 2d 398, 56 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1967),
where the court succinctly stated:
Even in the absence of a showing of former practice or conduct, there must
be . . . some showing of the relationship and intimacy of the prospective donees
with the incompetent in order to show that they would be objects of the incompetent's bounty by any objective test. Here again the matter is relative, and
dependent on reasonable standards. It is not likely that an incompetent would
provide for a divorced daughter-in-law whom he never knew, and the fact that
his total net estate on his death would be enhanced by a gift to her is of no
consequence. On the other hand, it may be inferred that he would, if sane, have
reasonable concern in her son as his grandson. A gift to him would be proper.
Id. at 427, 56 Cal. Rptr. at 524-25.
31. The impact of a showing of need by the recipient was recognized in Ex parte
Whitbread, 35 Eng. Rep. 878 (Mer. 1816).
32. For an example of a court's determination of the factors to be considered in
authorizing a distribution out of an incompetent's estate, see In re Fleming, 173 Misc.
851, 19 N.Y.S.2d 234 (Sup. Ct. 1940). In ordering the allowance the court stated:
In determining whether the incompetent, if sane, would contribute to the support of such persons (relatives to whom no duty of support is owed), the Court
must be governed by the proof presented as to the needs and necessities of the
person seeking the allowance; as to the relationship and intimacy which he and
the incompetent bore to each other prior to adjudication; and as to the present
and probable future requirements of the incompetent himself and those for whose
support he may be legally liable, considered in relation to the size and condition
of his estate - giving to each of these and any other pertinent factors such weight
as from all the circumstances it finds the incompetent would give.
Id. at 853, 19 N.Y.S.2d at 236.
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Statutory Law

Notwithstanding the traditional case law application of the substitution
of judgment doctrine which enables courts to act for the benefit of incompetents, to a large extent statutes now regulate the control that courts
may exercise over the estate of an incompetent and define the purposes
for which expenditures may be authorized. With respect to the statutory
regulation of this control, the courts in the United States may be divided
into two groups: (1) those which view their power over the estates of
incompetents as strictly limited by statutes and which tend to construe
such statutes narrowly against an allowance; and (2) those courts giving
a broad interpretation to their authority and what they consider the best
interests of the estate.
An example of a court strictly construing a state statute in determining whether a guardian should have the power to make a gift from the
ward's estate is the 1966 Texas decision of In re Neal.83 In Neal, the
guardian of the estate of an incompetent sought authorization to make a
present gift, for the purpose of minimizing the estate taxes that would be
levied upon the incompetent's heirs at his death . 4 The guardian contended
that under the provisions of the Texas Probate Code a guardian has the
common-law power to make a gift from the ward's estate where the ward,
if competent, would do so.3 5 However, the court, while recognizing the
substitution of judgment doctrine, 86 denied its application concluding "that
any order authorizing the gift . . . would be in excess of the power dele' 7
The court
gated by the [s]tatutes of this state and would be invalid.
for disprovided
expressly
found that other statutory provisions which

33. 406 S.W.2d 496 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966), aff'd per curiam, 407 S.W.2d 770
(Tex. 1966).
34. 406 S.W.2d at 499.
35. TEX. PROD. CODE ANN. § 32 (1956), states:
The rights, powers, and duties of executors, administrators, and quardians
shall be governed by the principles of the common law, when the same do not
conflict with the provisions of the statutes of this State.
The court found this section inapplicable and rejected the guardian's contention,
concluding that:
[E]ven if the words, "principles of the common law," are construed to include equitable powers, this section of the code does not grant to the court common
law powers, but merely provides that the rights, powers and duties of executors,
administrators, and guardians shall be governed by the principles of the common
law, when the same do not conflict with the provisions of the statutes of this State.
406 S.W.2d at 500.
36. 406 S.W.2d at 500. See TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 230(b) (1956), for a summary of the duties imposed on guardians in exercising their judgment. This provision
states in pertinent part:
The guardian of the estate of a ward is entitled to the possession and managenient of all properties belonging to the ward.... It is the duty of the guardian
of the estates to take care of and manage such estate as a prudent man would
manage his own property. He shall account for all rents, profits, and revenues
that the estate would have produced by such prudent management.
However, the court felt that this section "must be construed in conjunction with other
statutory provisions which set out more specifically what a guardian may do and by
implication what a guardian may not do. . . ." 406 S.W.2d at 501.
37. 406 S.W.2d at 503.
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tributions out of income under certain conditions,"8 and which provided
for the support of his family89 limited the powers of the court, and precluded application of the substitution of judgment doctrine where the
primary purpose for making the gift was to avoid estate taxes.
Illustrative of a state court decision in which the doctrine has been
applied through a broad interpretation of the statutory law pertaining to
the management of an incompetent's estate is the California case of Estate
of Christiansen.40 In Christiansen the guardian sought permission to distribute part of the principal of an incompetent's estate to prospective heirs
for the purpose of avoiding estate taxes. 41 After an examination of existing precedents, 42 the court stated that any authority for the distribution
of an incompetent's property "must be found in the application of what is
sometimes referred to as the doctrine of substituted judgment. '4 The
court then rejected the argument that the application of the substitution
of judgment doctrine is specifically limited by the express provisions of
the California Probate Code which states in pertinent part that:
On the application of the guardian or the next of kin of an insane
or incompetent person, the court may direct the guardian to pay and
distribute surplus income, not used for the support and maintenance
of the ward, or any part of such surplus income, to the next of kin
whom the ward would, in the judgment of the court, have aided, if
said ward had been of sound mind. The granting of such allowance
and the amounts and proportions thereof shall be discretionary with
the court, but the court shall give consideration to the amount of
surplus income available after due provision has been made for the
proper support and maintenance of the ward, to the circumstances
and condition of life to which the ward and said next of kin have been
accustomed and to the amount which the ward would, in the judgment
38. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 398 (c) (1956), states in pertinent part:
[I]f the court is satisfied and finds from the evidence that the amount of the
proposed contribution stated in the application would probably not exceed twenty
per cent of the net income of the ward's estate for the current calendar year, and
that the net income of the ward's estate for such year exceeds, or probably will
exceed, Twenty-five Thousand Dollars, and that the full amount of such contribution, if made, will probably be deductible from the ward's gross income, in
determining the net income of the ward under the applicable income tax laws,
rules, and regulations of the United States of America, and that the condition
of the ward's estate is such as to justify a contribution in said amount, and that
the proposed contribution is reasonable in amount and is for a worthy cause, the
court in its discretion may enter an order authorizing the guardian to make such
contribution from income of the ward's estate to the particular donee designated
in said application and order....
39. TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. § 421 (1956), provides:
The court by which any incompetent is committed to guardianship may make
orders for the support of his family and the education of his children, when
necessary (emphasis added).
40. 248 Cal. App. 2d 398, 56 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1967).
41. Id. at 403, 56 Cal. Rptr. at 509. Although the guardian additionally contended
that the gifts would permit enjoyment of the incompetent's property by her family
during her lifetime, it was not asserted that any payments were necessary for the
support of any of the proposed distributees.
42. Harris v. Harris, 57 Cal. 2d 367, 369 P.2d 481, 19 Cal. Rptr. 793 (1962)
Guardianship of Hall, 31 Cal. 2d 157, 187 P.2d 396 (1947) ; Guardianship of Hudelson,
118 Cal. 2d 401, 115 P.2d 805 (1941).
43. 248 Cal. App. 2d at 407, 56 Cal. Rptr. at 511.
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of the court,44 have allowed said next of kin, had said ward been of
sound mind.

In interpreting the authority to be derived from this section of the Probate
Code the court concluded that "the provisions of section 1558 do not
preclude the courts of this state from exercising the substituted judgment
'45
doctrine in situations not covered by that section.
In comparison with the Neal rationale, the Christiansendecision illustrates how a liberal interpretation of state statutes will facilitate the logical
management of an incompetent's estate. By utilizing broad discretionary
powers the Christiansen court, in permitting the distribution out of the
incompetent's estate for the purpose of avoiding estate taxes, has allowed
the guardian to take advantage of the existing tax structure for the benefit
of the incompetent's estate.
Since 1941,46 California has recognized that the "endorsement of a
policy of flexible procedure, resting in the sound discretion of the court,
permits recourse to principles of equity which are responsive to the interests
'47
of both the ward and next of kin."
In the discussion of tax planning for incompetents that will follow,
it will be noted that other states, including Pennsylvania, have alluded to
the problem of evaluating a particular state statute in order to determine
its effect on the common law substitution of judgment doctrine. However,
the only case law in this area is derived from a few isolated decisions in
Texas and California, which have dealt with the problem in depth and,
while closely analyzing their own pertinent statutes, have reached different
conclusions in the interpretation of these similar statutes. 48 These dif44. CAL. PROB. CODE § 1558 (West 1956).
45. 248 Cal. App. 2d at 411, 56 Cal. Rptr. at 514.
46. Guardianship of Hudelson, 18 Cal. 2d 401, 115 P.2d 805 (1941).
47. Id. at 407, 115 P.2d at 809.
48. Compare TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 230(b) (1956), which states in pertinent part:
The guardian of the estate of a ward is entitled to the possession and man-

agement of all properties belonging to the ward ....
It is the duty of the guardian
of the estate to take care of and manage such estate as a prudent man would
manage his own property. He shall account for all rents, profits, and revenues
that the estate would have produced by such prudent management.
with CAL. PROB. CODE § 1502 (West 1956), which provides:
Every guardian of an estate must manage it frugally and without waste,
and apply the income, as far as may be necessary, to the comfortable and suitable
support, maintenance and education of the ward and his family, if any; and if
the income is insufficient for that purpose, he may sell or mortgage or give a
deed of trust upon any of the property ...
These sections merely list the general duties imposed upon guardians in the
exercise of their judgment. However, the application of these provisions by the Texas
and California courts has varied.
In interpreting section 230 the Texas court felt that the general language
"must be construed in conjunction with other statutory provisions which set out more
specifically what a guardian may do and by implication what a guardian may not do
in the management of the ward's estate." 406 S.W.2d at 501. However, the California
court rejected a similar argument that the general duties imposed on the guardian
prevent him from making "any disposition of the income or principal of the ward's
estate other than as expressly ... provided to the contrary." 248 Cal. App. 2d at 411,
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ferent interpretations indicate that the effect of state statutes on the
common law substitution of judgment doctrine will depend upon whether
the particular court considers itself strictly bound by the statutory language
as the Texas court did, or whether the court will follow the reasoning of
the California court and liberally construe the statute in order to effectuate
the most equitable estate plan. It is submitted that unless uniform guidelines are adopted similar to those proposed by Article V of the Proposed
Uniform Probate Code 49 an increasing number of courts will be confronted
with similar problems of interpretation. The courts will most probably
continue to differ on how the substitution of judgment doctrine is to be
applied even though they are interpreting statutes of similar construction.
C. Application of Doctrine for Tax Purposes
The application of the substitution of judgment doctrine to avoid
unnecessary estate or inheritance taxes has been of great significance to
estate planners.50 Several courts have granted a guardian authority to
dispose of surplus income and portions of the corpus of an estate through
a gift where the object of the gift is not to meet any needs of the applicant,
but solely to effectuate a sound estate plan.
In re du Pont51 is an excellent example5 2 of a court applying the
substitution of judgment doctrine for the sole purpose of saving estate
taxes. In this case the court decided that it "is empowered to invoke the
so-called substitution of judgment doctrine . . .-53 to grant authorization
to the guardian to make gifts of the incompetent's assets 54 to his children
and grandchildren through an inter-vivos trust. This conclusion was
reached through a liberal interpretation 5 of a statute which provides that
56 Cal. Rptr. at 514. The court concluded that specific authority for each act of the
guardian is not necessary. It was stated that the specific provisions of the statute "do
not preclude the courts of this state from exercising the substitution of judgment
doctrine in situations not covered by [those provisions]." 248 Cal. App. 2d at 411,
56 Cal. Rptr. at 514.
49. See pp. 145-47 infra.
50. For a thorough analysis of tax planning for estates, see C. LOWNDES & R.
KRAMER, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXES §§ 38.1-47.12 (2d ed. 1962).
51. 41 Del. Ch. 300, 194 A.2d 309 (1963).
52. Apparently, In re Carson, 39 Misc. 2d 544, 241 N.Y.S.2d 288 (Sup. Ct. 1962),
decided a year earlier than du Pont, is the first case to permit distribution of a
portion of the corpus of the incompetent's estate solely to realize the substantial
savings in taxes and administration expenses. In upholding the gift the court stated
that "to do otherwise would lead to a result increasing estate costs to a point hardly
consistent with our modern concept of estate planning for tax and other legitimat
estate benefits." Id. at 547, 241 N.Y.S.2d at 290.
53. 41 Del. Ch. at 314, 194 A.2d at 317.
54. The gifts were valued at $36,000,000. Although the children, all adults, were
not in financial need, evidence was introduced to show that the requested transfer
would provide the heirs with a substantially greater benefit, through tax savings of
approximately $16,100,000. Id. at 302-04, 194 A.2d at 310-11.
55. Where, as in In re Neal, 406 S.W.2d 496 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966), the view
has been adopted that courts which administer the estates of incompetents are severely
limited by statute, the substitution of judgment doctrine has been rejected if authorit)
for its application was not expressed in the existing statutes.
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"[a] trustee may, . . .do whatever is necessary for the care, preservation,
and increase of his [ward's] estate." 56
In In re Kenan,5 7 a court-appointed guardian sought authorization,
pursuant to legislative enactments,1 s to make certain gifts to charities for
tax purposes.5 9 The purpose of these gifts was to effectuate a sound estate
plan rather than to aid the individual beneficiaries. In its determination
of the applicability of the substitution of judgment doctrine the supreme
court concluded:
A court may authorize a fiduciary to make a gift of a part of the
estate of an incompetent only on a finding, on a preponderance of the
evidence

the gift.60

.

.

. that the lunatic, if then of sound mind, would make

The court, however, denied the request of authority on the ground that
the lower court's finding that the incompetent, if competent and heeding
sound advice, would have made the gifts was not supported by the evidence. On the second appeal, 61 a divided supreme court found the evidence
adequate to support the lower court's findings of fact that the incompetent
would have made the gifts to charities and affirmed the judgments granting the guardian authority to make them on her behalf.
The underlying rationale behind a liberal application of the substitution of judgment doctrine for tax purposes was succinctly summarized in
62
Estate of Christiansen.
There it was determined that:

To refuse to permit the management of the incompetent's estate
in the manner that a reasonable and prudent man would manage his
estate may, in many cases, lead to the improbable conclusion that it
was the intent of the incompetent to enrich the taxing
6 3 authorities
rather than the natural or declared objects of his bounty.
It is submitted that effective management of an incompetent's estate
necessarily entails the extention of the doctrine to allow for beneficial tax
planning. It would be unreasonable to assume that a ward, if competent
would not recognize the different tax consequences between estate and
gift taxes. 64 Any concerned individual with a sizable estate should realize
56. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3705 (Supp. 1968).
57. 261 N.C. 1, 134 S.E.2d 85 (1964).
58. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 35-29.1 to .16 (1966).
59. The proposed donations consisted of $731,600 from the income of the ward,
$100,000 from the principal of her estate, and a life estate of approximately $300,000
per year in a revocable trust.
60. 261 N.C. at 9, 134 S.E.2d at 91.
61. In re Kenan, 262 N.C. 627, 138 S.E.2d 547 (1964).
62. 248 Cal. App. 2d 398, 56 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1967). See also In re Myles, 57
Misc. 2d 101, 291 N.Y.S.2d 71 (Sup. Ct. 1968).
63. 248 Cal. App. 2d at 423, 56 Cal. Rptr. at 522.
64. See generally Oppenheim, The Donation Inter Vivos, 43 TUL. L. REv. 731

(1969).
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that savings will result if the gifts escape the estate tax and are taxed
solely under the lower-rate gift tax. 69 Even if gifts should be held to be
in contemplation of death 66 and therefore restored to the gross estate for
estate tax purposes, some savings will result.6 7
In addition to the savings resulting from inter vivos gifts, certain tax
deductions are available upon the establishment of a trust for charitable
purposes. 68 Prior law allowed a deduction for property transferred to a
trust as corpus to generate income to the income beneficiary for life with
the remainder passing to charity. Generally, an income tax deduction was
allowed for the present value of the charitable remainder 69 and, for the
purposes of estate and gift taxes, a deduction was allowed for the value
of the remainder if the corpus of the trust was included in the gross
estate. 70 However, in order to assure that the charity received the value
permitted as deductions, the Tax Reform Act of 196971 will only allow
73
these deductions 72 where the trust is a charitable remainder annuity trust
or a charitable remainder unitrust. 74 Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to
assume that the incompetent, if able, would avail himself of the tax
advantages by conforming with the more stringent requirements of the
Tax Reform Act. The rationale which is used to extend the substitution
of judgment doctrine to permit distributions solely for tax purposes 75
should also apply to permit the courts to authorize the establishment of
the appropriate charitable trusts.
65. Compare INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 2001, with INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 2502.
66. See INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2035.
67. In such a situation the gift tax is available as a credit against the estate tax.
INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2012.
68. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 170, 2055.
69. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 170.
70. INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, §§ 2055, 2522.
71. 83 Stat. 487 (1969).
72. Tax Reform Act of 1969, § 201, 83 Stat. 549 (1969). There is one exception
where a charitable deduction for income tax will be allowed. See note 73 infra. Also,
where the remainder is real property which passes to a charity, a deduction for estate
tax purposes will be allowed. Tax Reform Act of 1969, § 201, 83 Stat. 549 (1969).
73. A charitable remainder annuity trust is one where a fixed sum (not less than
5% of initial principal) is to be payable at least annually to income beneficiaries for
life or for a term not exceeding twenty years. For example, $10,000 yearly regardless
of whether income is more or less than $10,000. See Tax Reform Act of 1969,
§ 664(d) (1), 83 Stat. 563 (1969).
74. A charitable remainder unitrust is one where a fixed percentage (not less
than 5%) of the net fair market value of the total fund, valued annually, is to be paid
at least annually to the income beneficiaries for life or for a term not exceeding
twenty years. For example, the fund at the beginning of the year is $100,000, income
to valuation date is $10,000 and unrealized appreciation to that date is $10,000. Total
value of the fund on the valuation date is $120,000. If 5% is to be paid to the income
beneficiary, the amount payable is $6,000. See Tax Reform Act of 1969, § 664(d) (2),
83 Stat. 563 (1969).
However, a unitrust (but not an annuity trust) may provide that if the trust
income is less than the required amount, only the trust income for the year must be
paid over. Thus, no invasions of principal will be required to make good an income
deficiency, but the deficit must be made good in later years where income exceeds the
required amount. See Tax Reform Act of 1969, § 201, 83 Stat. 549 (1969).
75. See p. 140 supra.
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A.

History

The substitution of judgment doctrine has been approved and applied
by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania since 1883.76 In Hambleton's
Appea 7 7 the court established definite guidelines in permitting the distribution of an incompetent's estate to needy relatives, which have led
to an intelligent application of this doctrine by the judiciary. First, the
court recognized that in administering the incompetent's estate "his personal comfort and welfare are the prime objects which are to be kept in
view. ....

*"78

It was further noted that the court should endeavor to

continue the affairs of the incompetent as they were prior to his affliction
and "to do that which it might reasonably [be] suppose[d] he would have
'7 9
continued to do, had he retained his sanity.
Following the Hambleton guidelines, Pennsylvania courts have extended the doctrine of substituted judgment to permit allowances for
purposes other than the support of the immediate family, which the incompetent has a legal duty to provide.8 0 For example, the courts have
authorized distributions to the older child 8 ' and mother of an incompetent.8 2
Notwithstanding the guidelines established in Hambleton, the application of the substitution of judgment doctrine in Pennsylvania is now
regulated by statute - Section 644 of the Incompetents' Estates Act of
1955.83 This provision, which controls the distribution of an incompetent's
property, states :
All income received by a guardian of the estate of an incompetent, in the exercise of a reasonable discretion, may be expended in
the care and maintenance of the incompetent without the necessity
of court approval. The court, for cause shown, may authorize or
direct the payment or application of any or all of the income or
principal of the estate of an incompetent for the care, maintenance or
education of the incompetent, his spouse, children or those for whom
he was making such provision before his incompetency, or for the
reasonable funeral expenses of the incompetent's spouse, child or indigent parent. In proper cases, the court may order payment of
amounts directly to the incompetent for his maintenance or for incidental expenses and may ratify payments for these purposes.8 4
On its face this statutory provision seems to leave very little discretionary power in the court and could be strictly construed to altogether
76. Hambleton's Appeal, 102 Pa. 50 (1883).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 54.
79. Id. at 53.
80. Generally, the traditional application of the doctrine in Pennsylvania is similar
to its application throughout the country. See pp. 133-35 supra.
81. See Mechlowitz Estate, 71 Pa. D. & C. 469 (C.P. Lack. Co. 1949).
82. See Kelley's Estate, 34 Pa. D. & C. 166 (C.P. Schuyl. Co. 1938).
83. PA. STAT. tit. 50, § 3644 (1969).
84. Id.
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exclude the application of the doctrine. However, the courts have interpreted this statutory language very liberally and have found implied
authority for the continued application of the substitution of judgment
doctrine to permit distributions out of incompetents' estates. The discussion which follows, concerning the application of this doctrine for tax
purposes, will examine the courts' analysis and interpretation in arriving
at this implied authority.
B.

The Application of the Doctrine For Tax Purposes
in Pennsylvania

One of the more controversial areas in Pennsylvania law has been the
limits of the power of the courts to grant or authorize gifts or allowances
out of the estate of an incompetent solely to obtain a reduction of his
taxable estate. The Pennsylvania case which initially decided this issue
was Bullock's Estate.8 5 This case has been cited 6 repeatedly as authority
for the proposition that the substitution of judgment doctrine cannot be
extended to permit distributions solely to obtain tax advantages. In
Bullock the guardian requested permission to distribute to the wife and
two daughters of the incompetent the amount of income in excess of
expenses which had accumulated in the estate, for the purpose of reducing
inheritance and estate taxes. After analyzing the applicable statutory
provision,8 7 the court refused to grant an allowance on the basis that the
Pennsylvania statute did not expressly authorize such distributions. The
court went on to say that "[t]ax avoidance is not a sufficient legal ground
for the intestate distribution of any part of an incompetent's estate while
he is putatively testate and actually alive."88
Notwithstanding this strict statutory interpretation, the court in
Groff Estates9 distinguished Bullock and employed the substitution of
judgment doctrine in authorizing gifts out of the incompetent's estate for
the purpose of reducing taxes.90 In reaching its decision the court recognized the origin of this doctrine in Ex parte Whitbread9' and its application in Pennsylvania since 1883.92 While justifying the applicability of

the doctrine in the instant case the court found it necessary to rationalize
the exclusion of the substitution of judgment doctrine in the Bullock
opinion. The court mentioned two reasons why the inapplicability of the
85. 10 Pa. D. & C.2d 682 (Orphans' Ct. Del. Co. 1957).
86. See, e.g., Estate of Christiansen, 248 Cal. App. 2d 398, 415-16, 56 Cal. Rptr.
505, 517 (1967) ; In re du Pont, 41 Del. Ch. 300, 313, 194 A.2d 309, 316 (1963);
112 U. PA. L. REv. 1083, 1085 (1964); 67 W. VA. L. REV. 320, 324 (1965).
87. PA. STAT. tit. 50, § 3644 (1969). For the precise statutory language, see
p. 142 supra.
88. 10 Pa. D. & C.2d at 685.
89. 38 Pa. D. & C.2d 556 (Orphans' Ct. Montg. Co. 1965).
90. It was determined that if the inter vivos gifts were authorized, the savings
in taxes would be $244,740, or, if found to be in contemplation of death, a little more
than $88,000. Id. at 563-64.
91. 35 Eng. Rep. 878 (Mer. 1816).
92. Hambleton's Appeal, 102 Pa. 50 (1883).
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doctrine in Bullock was not controlling in Grof
i: (1) because no reference
was made to the doctrine "it is evident that this was not called to the
attention of the court at all" ;9 and (2) "Even had this doctrine been . . .
recognized as supplying a legal foundation in a proper case, the court might
well have reached the same conclusion, declining to apply the doctrine
94
because of the weakness of the facts and surrounding circumstances."
The Groff court then interpreted section 644 of the Incompetents'
Estates Act of 195515 and determined that while this section may limit
the distributive powers of a guardian, "nothing is expressly stated there
or elsewhere in the act to circumscribe the power of the court."96 From
this statutory interpretation the court concluded that the Orphans' Court
Act of 195197 gave the orphans' court exclusive jurisdiction over the estates
of incompetents, 98 and it also "conferred on [this] court all legal and equitable powers required for or incidental to the exercise of its jurisdiction." 99
In summary, Groff agreed with the Bullock decision that absent any
statutory authorization for the guardian to distribute on incompetent's
estate, in those instances where he undertakes to do so on his own discretion his actions will be struck down as not "within the orbit of the
powers expressly conferred . .. ".,00However, the Groff court, finding
its authority in the appropriate provisions of the Orphans' Court Act,
ultimately concluded that the substitution of judgment doctrine should be
applied by the court to permit the proposed gifts in order to effectuate
a sound tax plan.
It is submitted that the orphans' courts of Pennsylvania will continue
to permit inter vivos gifts out of an incompetent's property for the sole
purpose of avoiding unnecessary taxes. These courts, finding their authority in a broad interpretation of the pertinent statutes, 10 1 should apply
the substitution of judgment doctrine so they may act for the incompetent
10 2
in a manner which it is reasonable to assume he would have acted
had he been sane.
93. Groff Estate, 38 Pa. D. &C.2d 556, 568 (Orphans' Ct. Montg. Co. 1965).
94. Id.
95. PA. STAT. tit. 50,

§

3644 (1969).

96. 38 Pa. D. & C.2d at 569.
97. PA. STAT. tit. 20, § 2080 (1964).
98. PA. STAT. tit. 20, § 2080.301 (4.1) (1964), provides that the orphans' courts
shall have exclusive jurisdiction of:
The administration and distribution of the real and personal property of the
estates of incompetents, except where jurisdiction thereof already has been
acquired by another Pennsylvania court. Another court which has acquired
jurisdiction of the estate may transfer it to the orphans' court.
99. 38 Pa. D. & C.2d at 569. PA. STAT. tit. 20, § 2080.304 (1964).

100. Bullkck Estate, 10 Pa. D. & C.2d 682, 685 (Orphans' Ct. Del. Co. 1957). It
has been consistently held that this is a question for the judgment of the court, and
without seeking and obtaining court approval, the guardian's independent action is a
nullity. See, e.g., Peden Estate, 409 Pa. 194, 198, 185 A.2d 794, 796 (1962).
101. PA. STAT. tit. 20, §§ 2080.301 (4.1)-.304 (1964).
102. For a discussion of the analysis involved in a court's determination of what
the probable conduct of the incompetent would have been, see p. 135 supra.
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PROPOSED UNIFORM

Analysis of Article V -

PROBATE

CODE

Protection of Persons

Under Disability and Their Property
This discussion is necessarily limited to Parts 3 and 4 of Article V
of the Proposed Uniform Probate Code 103 which concentrate on incapacitated persons10 4 and the protection of their property. The special guardianship principles related to the guardians of minors are beyond the scope
of this Comment.
1.

Part 3 -

Guardians of Incapacitated Persons

Generally, any competent person or suitable institution may be appointed guardian of an incapacitated person.' 0 5 It is the duty of this
guardian to provide for the comfort and maintenance of the person of his
ward. Also, if no conservator'0 6 - a person appointed by the court to
manage the estate of a protected person - for the estate of the ward
has been appointed, the guardian has limited authority over the property
of the ward. 10 7 However, where the ward has substantial property it is
usually desirable to have "protective proceedings"' l 8 to handle the management of his estate. Where a conservator has been appointed the
guardian must account to him for the funds expended, but if there is
no appointed conservator, the guardian must include an accounting for
the ward's property in the regular report submitted to the court concerning the ward's personal condition. 10 9
2.

Part 4 -

Protection of the Property of Minors
and Persons Under Disability

The court may appoint a conservator of the estate if it is determined
that the person is unable to manage his own property and "the person
has property which will be wasted or dissipated unless proper management is provided. .
".."1U0 If the determination is made that sufficient
grounds do exist for the appointment of a conservator, the court which
103. For a concise summary of the background of the

PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 206, 207 (1969).

PROBATE CODE,

see 4 REAL

104. An incapacitated person is one who is impaired by reason of mental illness,
mental deficiency, physical illness or disability, advanced age, chronic use of drugs,
chronic intoxication or other cause except minority, to the extent that he lacks sufficient
understanding or capacity to make or communicate responsible decisions concerning
his person (emphasis added). PROBATE CODE § 5-101 (1).
105. PROBATE CODE § 5-311(a).
106. PROBATE CODE § 1-201(f).
107. A guardian's responsibility is the care of the ward himself. The management
of the property of the estate is undertaken by the conservator under the supervision
of the court. See discussion p. 146 infra.
108. These are proceedings to determine that a person who has an estate cannot
effectively manage it. PROBATE CODE § 5-101(2). At such a proceeding the court may
appoint a conservator or make other orders protecting the estate. PROBATE CODE
§ 5-401.
109. PROBATE CODE §§ 5-312(e), (f).
110. PROBATE CODE § 5-401(b) (ii).
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is supervising the conservatorship is given all the powers which the individual would have if he were fully competent."'
The basic duty of a conservator is to act as a fiduciary and observe
the standard of care applicable to trustees." 2 Included in the powers of
the conservator is the authority to invest and reinvest funds of the estate." 3
In addition, the conservator may distribute the income or principal of the
estate for the support of the protected person and others who have been
maintained and supported by the incompetent, and he may make such
gifts to charity as the incompetent might reasonably have been expected
to make." 4 Although such powers may be executed without court authorization, gifts out of principal and those which exceed twenty percent
of the yearly income from the estate are permissible only after a court
hearing. However, as mentioned previously, the supervising court is given
the authority to act in the manner most beneficial to the disabled person." 5
B.

Effect of Article V

The statutory provisions discussed above set forth a broad listing
of powers which may be exercised. In those states where the substitution
of judgment doctrine is applied liberally with the best interests of the
estate as the goal, Article V would not lead to significant change. However, in those jurisdictions where the doctrine is construed very strictly
in light of existing state statutes, the adoption of Article V would have a
profound effect. By specifically granting all the powers which the individual would have if he were of full capacity, which is in effect the
incorporation of the substitution of judgment doctrine, the Proposed
Uniform Probate Code eliminates the necessity for a "liberal" or "strict"
interpretation of statutes in order to determine the degree of authority
that is granted to guardians of incompetents' estates. The adoption of
the Code would eliminate the possible determination, such as that made
by the Texas court, that since the statute does not expressly include the
substitution of judgment doctrine, or language similar thereto, such broad
powers were not intended and therefore should not be applied. Such an
interpretation restricts the distributive powers of guardians and thereby
ignores the practicalities of sound tax planning. Under the Code, however,
realistic estate planning, based on the utilization of tax advantages, would
become possible. Guardians and the courts would no longer be severely
111. PROBATE CODE § 5-408, Comment at 110. Note that the court, in effect, is
given the authority to substitute its judgment for that of the incapacitated person.
112. PROBATE CODE § 5-417. PROBATE CODE § 7-302, in describing a trustee's
standard of care, states in pertinent part:
[Tihe trustee shall observe the standards . . . that would be observed by a
prudent man dealing with the property of another, and if the trustee has special
skills or is named trustee on the basis of representations of special skills or
expertise, he shall be charged with using those skills.

113. PROBATE CODE
114. PROBATE CODE
115. PROBATE CODE
may be the motivation
§ 5-408 (c).

§ 5-424(b).
§ 5-425.

§ 5-408(d). It should be noted that anticipated tax savings
for the exercise of several of these powers.
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restricted in their distributive powers and would be free to manage the
estate on the basis of what the person himself would have done if he
were competent.
V.

CONCLUSION

Ideally, an attorney who is planning an estate will not be confronted
with the problem of determining whether a particular court will liberally
interpret the applicable statutes to permit the utilization of the substitution
of judgment doctrine. It would be most beneficial for all interested parties
if the attorney could persuade his client of the need for the creation of an
arrangement for the management of his estate which would become effective upon his becoming incompetent. This method of estate planning,
which is analogous to a will taking effect at death, alleviates the uncertainty in determining what the incompetent would have done.
Unfortunately, few individuals provide for the possibility of incompetency 6 and most estate planners must face the problem of determining
what inter vivos distributions they are authorized to make without an
express indication of the incompetent's intent. Therefore, the manner in
which a court applies the substitution of judgment doctrine becomes extremely important. It is submitted that the broad grant of judicial power
obtained through a liberal application of this doctrine, or through the
adoption of Article V of the Proposed Uniform Probate Code which incorporates it, is the most realistic solution to the problem of how to manage
an incompetent's estate. It enables guardians and the courts which supervise them to act in the best interests of their wards. By substituting its
judgment for that of the incompetent, the court is more likely to arrive
at a sound estate plan which will benefit each particular ward.
Michael P. Kane
116. See note 1 supra.
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